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Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and
Closing the Door on Section 1983
By LEON FRIEDMAN*
Introduction
On May 18, 1981, the United States Supreme Court decided Par-
ratt v. Taylor,' one of the most significant cases brought under 42
U.S.C. section 19832 of the last decade. The suit, brought by Bert Tay-
lor, Jr., a prisoner in a Nebraska state institution, involved the grand
total of $23.50-the cost of a hobby kit that Mr. Taylor had ordered
through the mails but which had been lost after it reached the Ne-
braska prison. It was Taylor's theory that the warden of the prison,
Robert Parratt, and the "hobby manager," Francis Lugenbill, were
negligent in allowing the hobby kit to be signed for by, and delivered
to, persons other than Taylor, contrary to prison regulations. The regu-
lations specifically required that the hobby materials be delivered only
to the prisoner ordering them and that the prisoner sign for them upon
receipt. Because Taylor was in segregation at the time the hobby kit
arrived, he was not permitted to receive it nor was he in a position to
sign a receipt, but two other persons (one civilian and one inmate)
signed for it.4 The regulations apparently did not cover this situation,
and Taylor claimed that the two supervisors-who knew nothing about
Taylor's kit themselves-"negligently" allowed the regulations to be vi-
olated by persons under their supervision. Rather than suing the two
people who signed for the kit, Taylor named only the warden and
hobby manager as defendants in a section 1983 suit.
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., 1954, J.D., 1960,
Harvard University.
1. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
2. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976).
3. 451 U.S. at 529.
4. Id at 530.
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Although both the district court and the court of appeals upheld
Taylor's claim,5 the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the suit. In
doing so, the Court settled an issue that had deeply divided the federal
courts and one with which the Supreme Court itself had grappled fruit-
lessly twice before,6 namely, whether or not a section 1983 claim can be
based on negligent conduct by a state actor. The Supreme Court, de-
ciding that the statute covers negligent deprivations of constitutional
rights, examined still another troubling issue in section 1983 jurispru-
dence: the effect an alternative state remedy has on a section 1983
claim if the state remedy would compensate the victim in state court for
the injury he suffered at the hands of a state official. The Court held
that at least in the context of a claim similar to that made by Taylor-
dealing with the loss of property because of the negligent actions of a
state officer-the existence of an alternative state remedy precludes a
section 1983 claim.7 In the words of the plurality opinion, the existence
of "postdeprivation remedies made available by the State,"' which give
a victim everything he lost, provides him with due process. Under
these circumstances, a prospective plaintiff in a section 1983 claim has
not been deprived of property without due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. He has been deprived of property but
with dueprocess oflaw, i e., a later, alternative state remedy that makes
him whole by giving him back exactly what he lost-under the facts of
Parratt, the $23.50 the plaintiff spent for the hobby kit.
The implications of the decision are enormous for section 1983 liti-
gation. If the Parralt decision is followed to its logical extreme, it
would undermine the basis for most section 1983 cases now brought in
federal court. Since Monroe v. Pape,9 it has been the law that an indi-
vidual who has been deprived of a constitutional right under color of
state law is not required first to pursue common law tort remedies in
state court, or worse, to litigate exclusively in state court. In Monroe,
5. Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57, slip op. at 3 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978). The district
court decision was not reported but is reproduced in Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at app.
B, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The court of appeals' summary affirmance is
reported at 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980).
6. The two prior Supreme Court cases dealing with the negligence issue were Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), and Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). See Par-
rat, 451 U.S. at 532-33. The division in the lower federal courts on the issue is referred to
by Justice Rehnquist in Parraft. Id at 533. In addition, see Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519
(8th Cir. 1979); Morris v. Gulley, 527 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. W.Va. 1981); Watson v. McGee,
527 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Cline v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 825 (D.S.D. 1981).
See also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 549 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
7. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
8. Id. at 538.
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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the Supreme Court rejected the argument advanced in Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Monroe: that unconstitutional acts by state officers
would subject those officers to common law remedies under state law
but would not give rise to a separate action under section 1983.10 Jus-
tice Frankfurter argued that the only proper path for a victim of such
acts was to sue for a common law tort in state court unless the acts were
done pursuant to a state statute or were "within the range of executive
discretion in the enforcement of a state statute."1 Precisely the same
argument was made and rejected with regard to suits against federal
officials in Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents.12 Parratt raises the
same arguments rejected in Monroe and Bivens but in a wholly new
context. The issue is no longer whether or not "under color of Law"
means in conformity with state law or in violation of it, as Justice
Frankfurter argued. 3 Parratt simply requires an examination of state
remedies to see whether or not they are adequate to compensate a vic-
tim where negligent losses ofproperty are alleged. If the principle is to
extend further-to intentional deprivations of property or liberty,' 4 and
negligent invasions of liberty interests,-then section 1983 would be
stripped of much of its force.
State and local officials followed the progress of the Parralt case
quite closely. Thirty-one states filed amici briefs urging reversal of the
lower courts' decisions.' 5 Since the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in that case, states' attorneys have argued in a series of cases
that the Parratt rationale should be applied across the board to inten-
tional deprivation of property,' 6 negligent deprivation of liberty, 7 and
even intentional deprivation of life.' 8 In Patsy v. Board of Regents,19
lawyers for the University argued that Parratt should be applied to
10. Id at 224 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
11. Id at 246.
12. 403 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1971). Bivens permits a federal action against federal officials
who violate the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 114-16 infra.
13. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 246 (Frankfurter, ., dissenting).
14. The extension to intentional loss of liberty has already been suggested by the
Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See notes 105-07 infra.
15. See 451 U.S. at 528-29 n.*.
16. Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (Parraft should apply where
law enforcement officers intentionally seized a coin, gun, and knife collection of a citizen).
17. Haygood v. Younger, 527 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (Parratt should apply
where state prison officers negligently kept an inmate in prison four and one-half years be-
yond his maximum sentence).
18. Brief for Petitioners at 13-14, O'Dell v. Espinoza, 633 P.2d 455 (1981), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 969 (1981); (Parratt should apply where the police were accused of deliberately
shooting and killing a subdued suspect who was lying on the ground).
19. 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981).
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equal protection claims where an administrative grievance procedure
within the University could be invoked.20 The general theory behind
the states' arguments in these cases is that Parralt requires an examina-
tion of all state remedies whenever a section 1983 case is filed. If the
state can compensate the victim of official wrongdoing through its ad-
ministrative or judicial processes, then a section 1983 claim cannot be
filed in federal or state court; existing state procedures supply the due
process necessary to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Can Parratt be read that broadly? Did the Supreme Court mean
to overrule Monroe v. Pape or even to start down that road? Are indi-
vidual acts of official misconduct to be relegated to state courts?
21
What logical limits are there to the Parratt holding, and how does the
case fit with earlier pronouncements by the Court that section 1983
stands as an independent and separate cause of action, distinct and dif-
ferent from common law tort claims? This article examines these
questions.
I. The Lower Court Decisions
As noted above, Taylor's theory was that the two prison officials
were responsible for the loss of the hobby kit because they somehow
failed to supervise the persons running the hobby office and failed to
insure that the prison regulations were followed. As a result of their
inaction, two other persons signed for the hobby kit who were not per-
mitted to do so. The state raised three issues at the district court level
in response to Taylor's claim. First, the state argued that negligence
could not be the basis for a section 1983 action under any circum-
stances. Since the claim against the prison officials could only be char-
acterized as negligence, the claim must fail. Second, the state argued
that penal complex officials were immune from damages in cases of this
kind. Third, the state argued that the amount involved-$23.50--was
20. Brief for the Appellant at 29-30, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1981).
21. Such an argument was made in one of the first comments on the Parratt case. See
Kirby, Demoting 14th Amendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A. J. 166 (1982) "[The
rationale of Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in that apparently trivial case marks a trail
that, followed to its logical conclusion, could lead to a sweeping curtailment of federal civil
rights litigation in favor of state courts and remedies. It ultimately may restrict 14th Amend-
ment due process or equal protection litigation to challenges to official policies or practices
directly attributable to the state as an entity, leaving individual acts of official misconduct by
state officers to be remedied under state law." Id at 167.
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so trivial that this loss could not be the basis for a section 1983 action.22
The district court granted summary judgment for Taylor.23 Re-
sponding to the first issue, the court held that "negligence can form the
foundation for an action under section 1983. "24 There was no signifi-
cant discussion by the district court of precisely what acts of Parratt
and Lugenbill could be considered negligent. Was it the issuing of reg-
ulations that did not cover the precise problem involving Taylor,
namely, the inability of a prisoner to receive the hobby materials when
he was in segregation? Or was it negligent to permit the regulations to
be violated by two strangers signing for the hobby materials? The dis-
trict court suggested that it was the latter, noting that the defendants
had failed "to follow their own policies concerning the distribution of
mail."25
In his discussion of the legal principles at issue, the district court
judge saw no complications with respect to the intent issue and found
that "negligence can form the foundation for an action under section
1983. "126 The district court relied on a passage from a Third Circuit
decision, Howell v. Cataldi,27 that generally discussed the need for
showing "culpable negligence" in tort law2 8 and on the famous oracu-
lar passage of Justice Douglas in Monroe v. Pape: "The word 'wilfully'
does not appear in Section [1983] . . . . Section [1983] should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his actions."2 9
The issue is, of course, far more complicated. The lower courts are
badly split on the issue, largely because of a failure to distinguish be-
tween the intent requirement in section 1983 cases generally and
whether or not a constitutional right was in fact violated. Lower fed-
eral courts, and to some extent the Supreme Court 30 have confused the
definition of the constitutional right at stake with the intent require-
22. Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari at app. B, app. 5, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981). Two other issues, later asserted before the Supreme Court, were not raised at the
district court level. See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
23. Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari at app. B, app. 4-9, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981).
24. Id at app. 6.
25. Id at app. 9.
26. Id at app. 6.
27. 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
28. Id at 279, quoted in Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57, slip op. at 3 (D. Neb., Oct. 25,
1978).
29. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187, quoted in Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57, slip op. at 3 (D.
Neb., Oct. 25, 1978).
30. See note 6 supra.
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ment in section 1983 actions.3'
The district court opinion also failed to discuss whether or not the
defendants were personally negligent in their supervision of the hobby
office. In a stipulation of facts that served as a basis for the motion for
summary judgment, there was no mention of any actions taken by Par-
ratt or Lugenbill, nor was there any indication that they had failed to
supervise their subordinates.32
The case law on the liability of superiors requires that some "per-
sonal involvement 33 must be shown before immediate superiors can
be held liable in a section 1983 action. Section 1983 actions are unlike
common law tort actions in that the mere right of a superior to control
his subordinates does not justify holding him liable for any unconstitu-
tional acts of subordinates. The Supreme Court explained in Monell v.
Department of Social Services , 3 "By our decision in Rizzo v. Goode, we
would appear to have decided that the mere right to control without
any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure
to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability.'35 The converse
of this statement appears to state the correct legal proposition: If
(1) control and direction are exercised, and (2) there is a failure to su-
pervise, then (3) liability will attach to a superior.
Thus, a sheriff who generally supervises the day-to-day activities
of his deputies,36 the warden who generally supervises the activities of
his guards, 37 or even the head of an administrative agency who gener-
ally supervises the activities of agency workers 38 would meet the first
part of the test. The result might well be different when we look at the
control that the mayor of a large city has over police officers on the
beat-for example, as in Rizzo v. Goode,39 a case in which control and
direction were too attenuated, at least as to the actions complained of in
that case.
31. See text accompanying notes 122-43 infra.
32. Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari at app. 1-3, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
33. Similar phrases have been used in numerous court cases. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976) ("affirmative link"); McLaughlin v. City of LaGrange, 662 F.2d 1385, 1388 (11th
Cir. 1981); Jones v. Denton, 527 F. Supp. 106, 109 (S.D. Ohio 1981) ("personally partici-
pated"); Carter v. Parsons, 526 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Rucker v. Grider, 526 F.
Supp. 617, 621 (W.D. Okla. 1980) ("personal participation").
34. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
35. Id at 694 n.58 (citation omitted).
36. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1980); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205
(5th Cir. 1979).
37. Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889
(4th Cir. 1973); Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
38. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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To meet the second part of the test, it is not necessary that the
superior actually order the unconstitutional act of the agent.40 If he did
not order the specific acts, a principal or superior could be liable under
the following circumstances: (1) if the superior establishes or promotes
a policy "which sanctioned the type of action which caused the viola-
tions"; 41 (2) if the superior fails to perform a specific statutory duty that
leads to the injury;42 (3) if the superior fails to perform a duty arising
from actual knowledge and that failure leads to a constitutional in-
jury;43 and (4) if the superior fails to establish reasonably adequate pro-
tective procedures when he should have known of constitutional
dangers to persons coming in contact with his agents.'
Under these tests, neither Parratt nor Lugenbill would be liable for
the illegal acts of the person who signed for the hobby kit. They did
not direct a policy that allowed others to sign for a prisoner's property;
indeed, they directed the opposite. They did not violate any statutory
duty. There was no evidence offered to show that they knew about the
practice at issue (if it was a practice) or about the specific event involv-
ing Taylor, nor was there any proof offered to show that they should
have known about this problem. Thus, the governing law would have
protected them from personal liability had the issue been properly
raised in the district court.
Responding to the second issue raised by the state at the district
court level, namely, that prison officials should be absolutely immune,
the court correctly found that only a qualified immunity applied. In
section 1983 cases, the only persons who can claim absolute immunity
are officials who act in a special institutional setting that requires
greater protection against the possibility of frivolous litigation. Thus,
judges,45 prosecutors,46 witnesses,47 and perhaps defense attorneys
48
40. If the superior did order the agent to perform unconstitutional acts, the superior
could also be liable under basic tort concepts that impose liability on a principal for illegal
acts ordered by him. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
"The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to
commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable nor that the
tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal." Id at 694.
41. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 831 (2d Cir. 1977).
42. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978).
43. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979); Byrd v. Birshke, 466 F.2d 6
(7th Cir. 1972); Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
44. Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877
(10th Cir. 1974).
45. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
46. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
47. Briscoe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3765
(1982).
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have an absolute immunity,49 but all executive branch officials, includ-
ing the governor of a state, have only qualified immunity.5 0 Qualified
immunity requires the injurious conduct to have been performed in
good faith; that is, the individual who was seeking to cause the injuries
to a person must have sincerely believed his conduct was legal (Ze.,
subjective good faith), and his belief in legality must have been reason-
able (ie., objective good faith).
5 1
The application of the qualified immunity/good faith defense
raises some difficulties under the facts of Parratt, since there was no
proof that Parratt and Lugenbill did anything or that they had any be-
lief in the legality of what their subordinates did. Once again, however,
the state did not focus on the question of what the prison officials did as
individuals but pressed an absolute immunity defense that simply did
not apply. Since the burden of proof as to the existence of the qualified
immunity/good faith defense rests with the defendant52 and no proof
was offered on the issue, the district court could properly reject that
defense.
The final issue raised by the state was that the amount of money
involved, only $23.50, was de minimis and could not serve as the basis
for a section 1983 claim.53 The federal courts have indeed established
some kind of minimum value for section 1983 claims, particularly
where only property loss was at stake. In Fuentes v. Shevin,54 the
Supreme Court suggested that there is a de minimis requirement for
section 1983 loss-of-property claims. After Fuentes, however, lower
federal courts did not merely focus on the de minimis requirement.
They would decide property seizure cases (especially when prisoners
were involved) based on other factors, including whether or not the
48. Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1982).
49. The rationale for granting absolute immunity for these people is that the institutions
in which they operate have built-in safeguards to insure against misuse of power and that
disgruntled litigants would be too prone to bring suit, thereby obstructing the administration
of justice. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Mistakes of judges or prosecutors can
always be corrected by appeals courts and protected against by the openness in which courts
work. Moreover, criminal sanctions would still be available against gross abuses. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
50. See generalo Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S., 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974). Friedman, The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 501 (1977).
51. Friedman, supra note 50, at 515.
52. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 666 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir.
1982).
53. Petitioners' Brief for Writ of Certiorari at app. 8, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981).
54. 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972).
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property was contraband 5 and could be seized regardless of value,
whether or not the taking was negligent,56 and whether or not the
prison had an administrative scheme for handling minor complaints
about property loss.57 When an intentional taking of property has oc-
curred that did not involve contraband and no alternative administra-
tive scheme exists, small amounts of property-as minimal as seven
packs of cigarettes-have been given protection by section 1983.58
Thus, a claim for $23.50 was arguably above the de minimis amount.
The state appealed the district court decision. In a briefper curiam
opinion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed without discuss-
ing the legal issues involved. "We have thoroughly examined the rec-
ord and now determine that, based upon the records and the oral
arguments, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed."59
The state filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Two
of the questions presented were the same as those argued in the district
court: "Whether simple negligence, if proven, may form the basis of
a judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ' '61 and "whether certain types of
property are so de minimis as to not be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "62 The state also raised two new
questions: "Where a state prisoner claims to have suffered a tortious
loss of property, whether the existence of a state tort claims remedy
available to that prisoner provides him with such a level of due process
as to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, '63 and
"whether this record supports a finding of negligence on the part of
either defendant."'  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on all
questions.65
Once the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parrall, it was obvi-
ous to anyone following the Supreme Court's section 1983 jurispru-
dence that the Court was going to reverse the lower courts' decisions.
55. Pitts v. Griffin, 518 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1975); Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277 (8th
Cir. 1970).
56. Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1980); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th
Cir. 1980).
57. Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1978).
58. Russel v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d .Cir. 1973). But see Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d
802 (8th Cir. 1976) (value of mail order catalogue too small for § 1983 claim).
59. Parratt v. Taylor, 620 F.2d 307 (1980).
60. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
62. Id
63. Id See also 451 U.S. at 537 n.3.
64. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Parratt v. Taylor, 521 U.S. 527 (1981).
65. 449 U.S. 917 (1980).
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Members of the Court had indicated in many different decisions that
the huge increase in section 1983 cases,66 particularly in prisoner sec-
tion 1983 actions, 67 was a matter of the greatest concern. Congress also
had shown concern by enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act in 1980,68 which requires exhaustion of administrative
remedies before resort to a section 1983 action by a prisoner is possible.
Parratt's action was precisely the kind of trivial, time consuming case,
inappropriate for federal court consideration, that the Supreme Court
justices had warned about. It served as the archetype-the worst horri-
ble example-of how section 1983 had "burst its historical bounds."6 9
Taylor, his lawyers, and other public interest groups saw which
way the wind was blowing. They had no doubt that the Supreme Court
took the case to reverse it, and many prisoners' rights groups saw it as
potentially a very serious threat to a broad range of section 1983 suits
brought on behalf of prisoners. Taylor took the unusual step of trying
to have his case dismissed before it was heard by the Supreme Court--
even though he had won in the lower courts-claiming that he had
received the $23.50 from other sources and was not interested in pursu-
ing the action."0 Taylor's motion to dismiss asked that the Supreme
Court dismiss the writ of certiorari and remand the case to the trial
court so that the complaint could be dismissed. The Supreme Court
denied his motion without comment;71 the case was to be determined
on its merits.
II. The State's Strategy
Because it was so likely that the Court favored the position of the
Nebraska Attorney General, he could almost pick and choose how to
win the case. He could concentrate on the negligence point,72 press the
de minimis point, or emphasize the applicability of Ingraham v.
66. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 554 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980)).
67. There were 218 filings of § 1983 cases by prisoners in 1966, but 12,397 filings of
§ 1983 cases by prisoners in fiscal year 1980. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 554 n. 13; AD.
OFF. OF U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 62 (1980).
68. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 1981).
69. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 554 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Writ of Certiorari at 2, Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981) ("Respondent has been paid by a person not a party to this action all sums
due and owing him under" the order of the district court).
71. 449 U.S. 1074.(1981).
72. The negligence point was an issue that the Supreme Court had considered in
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979),
but had not decided.
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Wright,73 in which the Court had prohibited a section 1983 action be-
cause an alternative state remedy existed. Although the Nebraska At-
torney General did discuss the negligence 74 and the de minimis7 5 points,
the major argument was based on Ingraham.
A. Alternate State Remedy
The Ingraham case was another action that tested the reach of sec-
tion 1983. Ingraham involved the practice of corporal punishment of
students in certain schools in Dade County, Florida. Pursuant to a
state statute, the school board in that county authorized, for discipli-
nary reasons, the paddling of students with a flat wooden paddle ap-
proximately two feet long, four inches wide, and one-half inch thick.7 6
One student who was so severely paddled that he had to stay home for
a week and another who was deprived of the full use of his arm for a
week were the named plaintiffs in a class action brought on behalf of
all students in the Dade County schools.77 The district court dismissed
the action at the close of the plaintiffs' case. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, after an initial vote to reverse,78 af-
firmed on rehearing.79
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, also upheld dismis-
sal of the action." In his majority opinion, Justice Powell found that
no Eighth Amendment right could be asserted by the students. The
Court reasoned that only convicted criminals-not students "pun-
ished" by paddling, no matter how severe-can claim Eighth Amend-
ment rights.81
The students had also asserted that their Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights were violated by corporal punishment. They had
claimed that they were deprived of liberty without due process of law
since the paddling was done by a teacher or principal immediately after
the student was accused of misconduct, without "process" or hearing of
73. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
74. See text accompanying notes 122-46 infra.
75. The first point in the state's brief was a one paragraph argument that $23.50 was too
small an amount to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at
7-8, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
76. 430 U.S. at 656.
77. Id at 657.
78. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
79. Id at 258; Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
80. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
81. 430 U.S. at 664 ("An examination of the history of the Amendment and the deci-
sions of this Court... confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.").
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
any kind. The plaintiffs relied on Goss v. Lopez,82 which held that stu-
dents cannot be suspended from school without some kind of rudimen-
tary hearing required by the due process clause, to support their claim
that the imposition of corporal punishment requires at least the same
kind of protection.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected the analogy and found
no due process violation. The Court agreed, that the imposition of cor-
poral punishment implicated the students' interest in liberty,83 but held
that prior notice and hearing were not necessary if later postdeprivation
remedies were adequate. Whereas the postdeprivation remedies to deal
with student suspension in Goss v. Lopez were clumsy and inadequate
and thus required some kind of prior informal hearing, the Court
found that the postdeprivation remedies available for corporal punish-
ment were not only adequate but also "may be viewed as affording
substantially greater protection to the child than the informal confer-
ence mandated by Goss. '84 Teachers can be sued for assault if they use
excessive or unnecessary force, and, in cases of gross abuse, criminal
sanctions are possible." It was the existence of these postdeprivation
remedies and their deterrent effect on excessive punishment that pro-
vided the students with due process.
In passing, the Supreme Court emphasized that these postdepriva-
tion remedies were also adequate because other safeguards would mili-
tate against abuse of power by teachers or disciplinarians. The Court
noted that "the public school remains an open institution." 86 A student
is "rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and
protest any instances of mistreatment."8 " A student leaves school at the
end of the school day and may even leave during school hours.8s Fur-
thermore, the community closely supervises the operation of the
schools. Finally, there is a "low incidence of abuse." 9
Four justices dissented in Ingraham. Justice White's dissent chal-
lenged the majority on both its Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
holdings. He argued that the word "punishment" appears in the
Eighth Amendment but that the word "criminal" does not and that this
82. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
83. 430 U.S. at 672.
84. Id at 678 n.46 (emphasis added).
85. "Teachers and school authorities are unlikely to inflict corporal punishment unnec-
essarily or excessively when a possible consequence of doing so is the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings against them." Id at 678.
86. Id at 670.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id at 678 n.46.
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omission "is strong evidence that the Amendment was designed to pro-
hibit all inhumane or barbaric punishments, no matter what the nature
of the offense for which the punishment is imposed." 90 As far as due
process is concerned, Justice White claimed that the later tort action
available to correct abuses was inadequate for two reasons. First, some
persons would be immune from later tort actions because they took
action based on "reasonable, good-faith mistake[s] in the school disci-
plinary process." 91 Second, even if later tort remedies were available,
such lawsuits occur "after the punishment has been finally imposed.
The infliction of physical pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be un-
done in a subsequent proceeding."92
Justice Stevens dissented separately. Although he agreed with Jus-
tice White's dissent, he made a special point of focusing on those situa-
tions in which postdeprivation remedies would be "constitutionally
sufficient." 93 He wrote a short, prescient opinion, stating in part:
When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is
a greater likelihood that a damages award will make a person
completely whole than when an invasion of the individual's in-
terest in freedom from bodily restraint and punishment has oc-
curred. In the property context, therefore, frequently a
postdeprivation state remedy may be all the process that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires.'
Justice Stevens had taken the same position in Bonner v. Coughlin95
while sitting as a circuit court judge. In Bonner, a prisoner lost a trial
transcript because his cell had been left open by some prison guards.
The first cause of action alleged that the guards themselves deliberately
took the transcript, and the second alleged negligence, that is, by negli-
gently leaving the cell door open, the guards allowed others to steal the
material. In Bonner, Judge Stevens, writing for the majority, dismissed
the second cause of action on the ground that the postdeprivation rem-
edy for the negligent deprivation of property satisfied due process re-
quirements.9 6 In Ingraham, Justice Stevens dissented on the ground
that when liberty interests are at stake and the deprivation was inten-
tional, a postdeprivation remedy will not suffice.
90. 430 U.S. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).
91. Id at 695.
92. Id
93. 430 U.S. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id
95. 517 F.2d 1311, 1318-20 (7th Cir. 1975), modfled en bane, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
96. 517 F.2d at 1319. The Parralt plurality opinion, which Justice Stevens joined, cited
and relied on .Bonner. See notes 147 & 163 and accompanying text infra.
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Could Ingraham be read as requiring examination of postdepriva-
tion remedies in other areas involving intentional deprivation of liberty
interests? What if a police officer used excessive force on an arrestee, or
if a prison guard used excessive force on a prisoner? Must the victims
be relegated to state common law remedies, as was the student com-
plaining of excessive force imposed by the teacher in Ingraham?
There are ways to distinguish Ingraham from situations involving
police officers and prison guards. Unlike public schools, prisons are
neither "open" institutions nor closely supervised by the community.
Unlike children, prisoners do not return home at the end of the day,
nor are many people available to witness and protest against their mis-
treatment. Furthermore, one cannot say that there is a low incidence of
abuse as far as claims of police or prison guard brutality are con-
cerned.97 The stakes are also much higher when police and prison
guards use physical force. A teacher cannot do a great deal of damage
with a flat paddle, but law enforcement officers can and do cause such
damage with guns or clubs. Finally, Florida state law allows teachers
to paddle students with reasonable force, so that a section 1983 action is
invoked when this privilege is abused by hitting too hard. On the other
hand, police and prison guards are not even allowed to hit citizens and
prisoners lightly as a form of summary punishment. Because we wish
to insure proper police conduct and compliance with constitutional
mandates in all law enforcement/citizen contacts, prepunishment hear-
ings are crucial due process safeguards. Because other checks on abuse
of power are not available when police or prison officials are involved,
section 1983 thus serves as a crucial watchdog over abuse of power by
state officials.
Furthermore, Ingraham decided only that teacher paddling did
not implicate any Eighth Amendment or procedural due process rights.
The Court quite specifically reserved the question of substantive due
process rights: "We have no occasion in this case ... to decide
whether or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a public
school child may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to
vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause." 9S Substan-
tive due process rights-which focus on factors such as the motive be-
hind physical force and its disproportionality-involve totally different
considerations than those involved in procedural rights or rights under
state assault and battery laws. Thus, in a post-Ingraham case, Hall v.
97. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?: A REPORT
ON POLICE PRACTICES (October 1981). See also Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1982).
98. 430 U.S. at 679 n.47.
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Tawney,99 the Fourth Circuit held that a student could still maintain a
section 1983 action against a teacher who allegedly hit her with a thick
rubber paddle "without apparent provocation," then "violently shoved
[her]. . . against a large stationary desk" and twisted her right arm so
that she was hospitalized for ten days. 100 The court found that state
assault and battery laws did not make distinctions on which substantive
due process rights were based.
In resolving a state tort claim, decision may well turn on whether
"ten licks rather than five" were excessive, see Ingraham v.
Wright, 525 F.2d at 917, so that line-drawing this refined may be
required. But substantive due process is concerned with viola-
tions of personal rights of privacy and bodily security of so differ-
ent an order of magnitude that inquiry in a particular case simply
need not start at the level of concern these distinctions imply. As
in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process
inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the
force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to
the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism
rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power liter-
ally shocking to the conscience. . . . Not every violation of state
tort and criminal assault laws will be a violation of this constitu-
tional right, but some of course may.10'
For these reasons, the Ingraham case has had limited applicability
to other section 1983 areas. The Supreme Court has not rushed to app-
ly Ingraham wherever alternative common law tort remedies were al-
ready in place. For example, the Court has continued to find section
1983 generally available in cases against law enforcement personnel,1
0 2
prison guards, 10 3 and public employers.' 4
In 1979, however, three members of the Court indicated a willing-
ness to extend Ingraham.'05 A group of policemen fired by the City of
Columbus, Georgia, brought a section 1983 action after initiating and
then abandoning administrative procedures that would have reviewed
the basis for their discharges. The district court held that the officers
could not switch in midstream from the police hearing board to a fed-
eral forum. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that there was no re-
99. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
100. Id at 614.
101. Id at 613 (citation omitted).
102. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
103. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
104. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
105. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905 (1979).
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quirement of administrative exhaustion, 0 6 and the city filed a petition
for certiorari. Only three justices voted to take the case: Justices Rehn-
quist and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger. In dissenting from the
denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[T]he time may now be ripe for a reconsideration of the Court's
conclusion in Monroe that the "federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked". . . . [T]he Court be-
lieved that this conclusion followed from the purpose of the Civil
Rights Act "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
although adequate in theory, was not available in practice." But
this purpose need not bar exhaustion where the State can demon-
strate that there is an available and adequate state remedy.
10 7
Justice Rehnquist confuses exhaustion of administrative remedies
with the existence of alternative state judicial remedies that would sup-
ply due process and be a substitute for section 1983. The issue in
Monroe concerned only the latter. The confusion between exhaustion,
which is merely a detour on the road to section 1983, and preclusion,
which is an absolute barrier, is a common one. Exhaustion is, properly
speaking, at issue when a state administrative remedy is available that
would afford relief similar if not identical to that sought in a section
1983 action. Under such circumstances, some courts have held that a
litigant must pursue those administrative remdies before coming back
to federal court, 0 8 but none of these courts have held that the availabil-
ity of the administrative remedy precludes a section 1983 action or that
the administrative decision is conclusive in a later section 1983
action.' 0 9
If a state court examined the issues involved in a section 1983 ac-
tion, its final judgment between the parties would be resjudicata in the
federal action,1'0 butpreclusion in the Parratt case is an entirely differ-
ent concept. Preclusion relies on the availability of a state judicial rem-
edy that has not yet been invoked and has not proceeded to final
judgment to act as a bar to a section 1983 action. Thus, preclusion goes
106. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 565 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1978).
107. 443 U.S. at 910-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981). Contra McCray v.
Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 361-65 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
109. But see Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982), in which the
plantiff in a Title VII action pursued her administrative remedies through the state Division
of Human Rights and then appealed the adverse decision to an appeals court within the
judicial system of the state. That court confirmed the administrative decision. The Supreme
Court held that the judicial determination upholding the administrative board was res
judicata.
110. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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much further than the cognate concepts of administrative exhaustion
and resjudicata. "'
The only other Supreme Court action between Ingraham and Par-
ratt that focused on the problem of alternative remedies was Carlson v.
Green, 1 2 a case involving a Bivens-type action'1 3 rather than a section
1983 action. In Carlson, the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs son, a
federal prisoner, had died as a result of hopelessly inadequate medical
treatment that met the standard of "deliberate indifference" required
by Estelle v. Gamble. 4 The deceased's mother sued various federal
prison officials directly under the Eighth Amendment, as permitted by
Bivens. She also added claims based on the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The Justice Department tried to advance an argu-
ment similar to that accepted by the Court in Ingraham, namely, that
the existence of alternative remedies precluded a constitutional cause of
action. The alternative remedy asserted was the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), which would have provided relief against the United
States for the medical malpractice claims at issue. The Justice Depart-
ment did not argue that there was no violation of a constitutional right,
but merely that the FTCA supplied an adequate remedy to the conduct
in question.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that Bivens stated
two exceptions to its rule that actions may be brought in federal court
against federal officials who violate the Constitution, even without stat-
utory authorization by Congress: (1) if there are "special factors coun-
selling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,"" 5
or (2) if Congress has itself provided an alternative remedy which "it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
111. In arguing Parrau, the Nebraska Attorney General correctly noted the difference
between administrative exhaustion and preclusion: "This position should not be confused
with a requirement that state administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a
§ 1983 action. Not only is this concept directly contrary to the long standing proposition
that § 1983 litigants cannot be required to exhaust state remedies, but ignores the fact that a
person is only entitled to due process once for one loss. If the state can provide a system
which meets the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and afford possible redress
where property has been lost due to the negligent acts of a state employee, then nothing
further need be afforded. No property has been taken without due process. No right se-
cured by the Constitution or laws has been abridged. No basis for an action under § 1983
exists." Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 12-13, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)
(citations omitted).
112. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
113. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
114. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
115. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971)); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979).
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Constitution and viewed as equally effective."' 6 The Court found no
special factors "counselling hesitation" in this case, since prison offi-
cials enjoy no independent or special status in the federal government;
nor was the FTCA ever viewed as a substitute for a Bivens-type action,
as it *as passed before Bivens was decided and was amended in 1974
under circumstances that did not meet the second part of the test. Fur-
thermore, the Bivens remedy is more effective. Bivens actions are filed
directly against the official involved and serve a deterrent purpose, but
FTCA actions are filed only against the United States. Punitive dam-
ages and jury trials are available in Bivens actions, but not in FTCA
actions. Finally, unlike Bivens actions, FTCA actions depend on local
tort laws; such a suit is possible "only if the State in which the alleged
misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that miscon-
duct to go forward."
'' 17
Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Chief
Justice Burger found the FTCA to provide an adequate remedy under
these circumstances."' Justice Rehnquist found Bivens itself to have
been wrongly decided and attacked the whole notion that the Constitu-
tion could serve as the basis for any damage remedy in the absence of
congressional authorization." 9
No one mentioned the possible analogy to Ingraham, although a
plausible argument could be formulated. If Ingraham held that alter-
nate state remedies could supply due process, why would not an al-
ternatefederal remedy do the same? Arguably, the FTCA supplied a
postdeprivation remedy, satisfying the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The problem with this analogy is that the paddling of
students by teachers and the death of a prisoner due to medical indif-
ference raise entirely different considerations. In the latter situation,
the Court in Carlson recognized the importance of a Bivens action as a
deterrent to insure compliance with constitutional requirements-an is-
sue that was clouded in Ingraham because of the limited need for de-
terrence, the existence of other safeguards, and the Court's explicit
holding that substantive due process rights were not at issue. The
Court was not ready to expand Ingraham to other areas.
Despite the Court's apparent unwillingness to extend Ingraham to
prisoners' claims, the Nebraska Attorney General saw the value of res-
urrecting the approach taken in that case. He noted that postdepriva-
116. 446 U.S. at 18-19 (citation omitted).
117. Id at 23.
118. Id at 30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id at 31-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tion remedies were held to be adequate under the due process clause in
a number of situations involving property deprivations °20 and argued
that the Nebraska tort claims procedure under which suits could be
brought against the state for losses of this kind fell within the type of
procedure previously held acceptable. 121
B. Negligence
The last argument made by the state in its brief in Parratt involved
the negligence issue. Here it made the same mistake that numerous
lower federal courts have made in discussing whether or not negligence
encompasses nonintentional conduct of every kind or only a particular
kind of conduct not affecting constitutional rights. If the latter, then no
section 1983 cause of action is possible on the basis of such conduct. If
the former, an inquiry is necessary to see whether or not constitutional
rights were affected and whether or not it was foreseeable that such
rights would be violated.
The Supreme Court had expressed its concern, at least as early as
Paul v. Davis, 22 that section 1983 should not be read to encompass all
causes of action recognized by local tort law whenever a state actor is
involved. "[S]uch a reading would make of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may
already be administered by the States." 123 The Court saw no reason
why, for example, "the survivors of an innocent bystander mistakenly
shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a govern-
ment vehicle . . . [should] have claims . . . cognizable under
§ 1983." z124 This example has struck members of the Court with consid-
erable force. For instance, during the oral argument in Procunier v.
Navarete, 25 the first case in which the Court explicitly examined the
issue of negligence, several justices asked hypothetical questions about
a mail truck negligently "going off the road. . . and losing the mail for
that reason," or a "mail truck negligently hitting somebody on his way
120. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits of 10-12, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
121. Id. at 12. "If a state-afforded, post-loss process is available to a prisoner who has
suffered a property loss due to the negligence of a state employee, and if that process other-
wise comports with due process requirements, then the prisoner is afforded his Fourteenth
Amendment rights by virtue of the existence of that process. If afforded the process due him
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the prisoner's rights have not been abridged and no basis
for a cause of action exists under § 1983." Id (footnote omitted).
122. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
123. Id at 701.
124. Id at 698.
125. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
to church." '126 In Parratt, the Court noted that to accept Taylor's argu-
ment that he suffered as the result of a constitutional violation "would
almost necessarily turn every alleged injury that may have been in-
flicted by a state official acting under 'color of law' into a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under § 1983. . . . Presuma-
bly, under this rationale any party who is involved in nothing more
than an automobile accident with a state official could allege a constitu-
tional violation under § 1983."127
The state argued in its brief in Parralt precisely along the same
lines:
Section 1983 had as its purpose, penalizing abuses of govern-
mental power in an attempt to coerce proper conduct by state
officials. Section 1983 cannot, by coercion, prevent simple negli-
gence . . . . Any manner of state neglect, e.g., auto accidents,
personal injuries, road repair, could then be litigated in federal
court under § 1983.128
It is apparent why an automobile accident caused by a negligent
state actor should not be the basis for a section 1983 action-no consti-
tutional right is at issue in such an event. The Constitution does not
protect one's right to walk down the street free from interference by a
negligently driven state vehicle.129 If, however, police officers negli-
gently drove their vehicle into some marching protesters when patrol-
ling near the parade or demonstration, a section 1983 claim should be
allowed if it was foreseeable that the First Amendment rights of the
marchers would be affected.
Some courts correctly distinguish between negligence as noninten-
tional conduct in general and the constitutional right that is being vio-
lated, allowing recovery if the constitutional violation is caused by
negligence. For example, section 1983 actions have been .allowed
against a prison administrator who negligently miscalculated the mini-
mum term of a prisoner, causing him to stay in jail four and one-half
126. L. Friedman, Personal Notes Taken During Oral Argument (Oct. 11, 1976) in
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (on file at offices of Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly).
127. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
128. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 20, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
129. See Walton v. Salter, 547 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976); Mann v. Village of Walden, 482
F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But, if the driver said to his partner, -I am going to get that
pedestrian because he insulted me," a constitutional question would be involved. The pe-
destrian is deprived of liberty without due process of law because he is summarily punished
by the police officer for his alleged offense.
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years beyond the term he should have served; 130 against a sheriff who
imprisoned a citizen because he erroneously believed that certain court
costs had not been paid, which would justify imprisonment;'13  and
against city officials who caused a citizen to be improperly arrested be-
cause although an erroneous warrant for his arrest was recalled, the
recall was not properly transmitted.132 These cases all involve viola-
tions of constitutional rights--either the liberty interest of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments or the right not to be seized unreasonably of
the Fourth Amendment-and therefore give rise to causes of action
under section 1983, even though the rights were violated by conduct
that was negligent rather than intentional. The victims' interests in
protecting and vindicating their constitutional rights were important re-
gardless of whether the state actor's conduct was negligent or inten-
tional. Conversely, section 1983 actions have not been allowed when
the negligent conduct did not violate any constitutional right. For ex-
ample, some police or prison detentions caused by negligence do not
give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest, 33 just as negli-
gent construction by a state causing injury to property 34 or life135 does
not violate a constitutional right; nor is there a constitutional violation
when a guard kills a bat after it has bitten a prisoner and flushes it
down a toilet so that the prisoner has to receive painful rabies shots
because the bat cannot be medically tested. 36 In each of these cases,
the focus is on the right affected, not on the intent with which the act
was done.
Sometimes the issues necessarily merge. Since Eighth Amend-
ment violations involve "cruel and unusual punishment," that Amend-
ment has been interpreted as requiring conduct with a particular state
of mind associated with it, such as medical treatment characterized by
130. Haygood v. Younger, 527 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Cal. 1981). See also Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969). Even though the prison official did not intentionally deprive
the person of liberty, a § 1983 action should lie whether or not a state law remedy exists.
131. Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), on remand, 641 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.
1981). The period of time the citizen was imprisoned was more than the minimum period
specified in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
132. Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom.
Finley v. Murray, 454 U.S. 962 (1981), cert. dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 2226 (1981).
133. Baker v. McCallon, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (three days over New Year's weekend does
not amount to a constitutional deprivation); Johnson v. City of St. Paul, 634 F.2d 1146 (8th
Cir. 1980) (two-hour detention caused by mistaken identity violates no constitutional right);
Williams v. Anderson, 599 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendants' reliance on one-day mis-
calculation of prison sentence was reasonable).
134. York v. City of Cedartown, 648 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981).
135. Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981).
136. Ronnei v. Butler, 597 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1979).
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"deliberate indifference" '137 or physical abuse accomplished with a pu-
nitive purpose. 3 8 In these situations, the constitutional right is defined
in terms of the state of mind that must accompany the conduct. With-
out that state of mind, there is no constitutional violation. To the ex-
tent that discriminatory intent must be shown to prove equal protection
and Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violations, that state of mind
must also be shown.139 This is true only as to Eighth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendment violations; First, Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amend-
ment violations may occur through negligence.
The lower federal courts have badly confused the issue. Most fol-
low Estelle v. Gamble,4 ' holding that gross negligence or recklessness is
the equivalent of intentional action, but then make distinctions be-
tween simple and gross negligence instead of concentrating on the con-
stitutional right at issue.' 41 For example, various section 1983 suits
were filed against high officials of the Philadelphia police force, claim-
ing that they failed to train, supervise, and discipline their police of-
ficers who had used excessive force against civilians. Lower federal
courts considered this assertion a claim of "mere negligence" on the
part of the supervisors. One court held that mere negligence could not
be the basis for a section 1983 claim, 42 while another held the
opposite. 143
The issue is not a question of mere negligence. Civilians have a
constitutional right not to be summarily punished by police and de-
prived of liberty without due process or arrested without probable
cause. If a police chiefs failure to train and discipline his officers were
the proximate cause of resulting injuries, and if it were foreseeable that
such an injury to constitutional rights would occur, then liability
should be found.1" To attach the word "negligence" to a superior's
failure to supervise and then to analyze the problem as if such failure
constituted a common law tort suit simply obscures the problem by
confusing the elements that must be shown before section 1983 can be
applied. Moreover, considering the broad power of supervisors to con-
137. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
138. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
139. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980).
140. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
141. See Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); Popow v. City
of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979).
142. Schweiker v. Gordon, 442 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
143. Norton v. McKeon, 444 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
144. Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th
Cir. 1972). But see Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869 (1982).
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trol the action of their agents-which in turn affects the constitutional
rights of many citizens-use of the term "mere negligence" in the com-
mon law sense is particularly inappropriate.
The issue may be further analyzed in terms of the distinction be-
tween negligence and intentional conduct. Prosser defines the issue as
follows:
In negligence, the actor does not desire to bring about the conse-
quences which follow, nor does he know that they are substan-
tially certain to occur, or believe that they will. There is merely a
risk of such consequences, sufficiently great to lead a reasonable
man in his position to anticipate them, and to guard against
them. If an automobile driver runs down a man in the street
before him, with the desire to hit him, or with the belief that he is
certain to do so, it is an intentional battery; but if he has no such
desire or belief, but merely acts unreasonably in failing to guard
against a risk which he would appreciate, it is negligence.'
If there is foreseeable risk to constitutional rights by certain negligent
actions of a state official, there is no reason why section 1983 should be
inapplicable. It will put state actors on notice that they will have to
guard against unnecessary risks to their citizens' constitutional inter-
ests. Where the "risk-taking" or failure by state officials to perform a
duty has the potential for inflicting widespread harm to the individuals
they are serving, such acts should be the basis for a section 1983 suit,
and so the courts have held. 146
III. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court decided Parratt on May 18, 1981. The deci-
sion produced an unusual line-up among the justices. Justice Rehn-
quist wrote the plurality opinion for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Brennan and Stevens. Justice Stevens' vote was predictable, in
light of his opinion in Bonner v. Coughlin and his dissent in Ingra-
ham. Justice Brennan, however, rarely votes with Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist in a section 1983 action.
148
145. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145 (4th ed. 1971).
146. Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); Beverly v. Morris, 470 F.2d 1356
(5th Cir. 1972); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d
819 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
147. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
148. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger voted on the opposite side of Justice
Brennan in the following § 1983 cases mentioned in the text: Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980) (Bivens-type action).
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The explanation for this unusual line-up was the double holding
of the case. In the first part of the opinion, the Court decided the negli-
gence issue in favor of a more expansive reading of section 1983. It
held, contrary to the state's assertion, that negligence can be the basis of
a section 1983 claim if a constitutional right has been violated. In the
second part of the opinion, the Court cut back on the civil rights statute
by resurrecting the Ingraham strategy. It held that where an alternate
state remedy exists in claims such as the one made by Parratt (negligent
loss of property), no section 1983 claim will lie, since the victim has
been given due process by the state's postdeprivation remedy.
A. Negligence
The Supreme Court has twice before tried to untangle the issue of
negligence in the context of a section 1983 claim. In Procunier v. Nava-
rette, 149 the Court granted certiorari on that question but decided the
case on another ground. The plaintiff claimed that his mail had been
negligently lost by prison officials. The Court held that the defendants
could not be held liable because they had established a good faith de-
fense as a matter of law: the right at issue-the prisoner's First
Amendment right to send mail-had not been established at the time
of the acts in question. Nor could the plaintiff prove that the defendant
prison official had maliciously intended to injure him. Since the claim
was based on the official's negligence, by definition the official did not
act maliciously. Thus, by establishing both subjective and objective
good faith, the prison official proved his qualified immunity.'
50
In Baker v. McCollan, 5' the Court again granted certiorari on the
negligence issue. That case involved a three-day imprisonment of a
person erroneously thought to be the object of an arrest warrant. The
victim's brother had been previously arrested in Amarillo, Texas, and
was wanted as a fugitive. The victim had given his brother's name to
the police and actually possessed a driver's license with his brother's
name, but his own picture, on it. The driver's license was confiscated
by the police, an act which indicated that they knew it was false. Nev-
ertheless, the police sent out a bulletin to pick up the victim, whose
name was on the driver's license. When the victim was stopped for a
routine traffic check in Dallas, the police discovered the outstanding
arrest warrant in his name, promptly arrested him, and returned him to
Amarillo, where he stayed in jail over a long holiday weekend until the
149. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
150. Id at 555-66.
151. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
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error was discovered. He sued the sheriff under section 1983 for de-
priving him of his liberty without due process.
The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether or not the
sheriff could be held liable for his negligence in establishing the identi-
fication system in his office. The Court noted at the outset that the
intent question may not be given "a uniform answer across the entire
spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might be the
subject of a § 1983 action."15 2 It held instead that no liberty interest
was violated because of the short period of time that McCollan had
been imprisoned-only "three days over a New Year's weekend
[which] does not and could not amount to such a [constitutional] depri-
vation."' 5 3 Thus, the issue of negligence was again avoided.
The Court in Parratt finally confronted the issue. It held that neg-
ligence could indeed be the basis for a section 1983 action. Justice
Rehnquist noted the absence of the word "willfully" in section 1983,
even though it appears in that section's criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C.
section 242.11 He quoted the familiar language from Monroe v. Pape
about the "background of tort liability that makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his actions."' 55 He concluded,
Both Baker v. McCollan and Monroe v. Pape suggest that
§ 1983 affords a "civil remedy" for deprivations of federally pro-
tected rights caused by persons acting under color of state law
without any express requirement of a particular state of mind.
Accordingly, in any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus
on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are pres-
ent: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this con-
duct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
156
The only justice challenging the Court's holding on negligence was
Justice Powell. He concurred in the judgment dismissing the action but
found the key feature to be the negligence issue. He thus parted com-
pany with the plurality opinion, which discussed the availability of al-
ternate state remedies. According to Justice Powell, Taylor should not
be allowed to recover, regardless of whether or not a state remedy ex-
isted, because Taylor's claim was based on negligence and thus did not
amount to a "deprivation'." Justice Powell defined "deprivation" as
"an intentional act denying something to someone, or, at the very least,
152. Id at 139-40.
153. Id at 145.
154. 451 U.S. at 534.
155. Id at 535 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187).
156. 451 U.S. at 535.
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a deliberate decision not to act to prevent a loss."' 5 7 He reasoned that
this interpretation is not only consistent with most lower court hold-
ings, but also avoids "trivializing the right of action provided in
§ 1983."
158
Based on the majority holding in Parratt, courts must now avoid
the confusion-by-label approach of transforming difficult section 1983
issues into negligence problems and using that concept to determine the
answer. They must ignore the issue of intent, except when a constitu-
tional right is defined in terms of a particular state of mind, and must
examine the nature of the constitutional right, state action, proximate
causation, and injury. The negligence detour is no longer viable.
B. Alternate State Remedy
The crucial part of the Parrat decision involved the issue of alter-
native remedies. Justice Stevens' approach, first suggested in Bonner v.
Coughlin, was accepted by the Court. Justice Rehnquist noted that
predeorivation hearings were required in many situations "before the
state interferes with any liberty or property interest enjoyed by its citi-
zens." 159 Some postdeprivation hearings by the state, however, have
been held to satisfy due process. Justice Rehnquist reasoned as follows:
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard and it is an "opportunity which must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." However, as
many of the above cases recognize, we have rejected the proposi-
tion that "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"
always requires the State to provide a hearing prior to the initial
deprivation of property. This rejection is based in part on the
impracticability in some cases of providing any preseizure hear-
ing under a state-authorized procedure, and the assumption that
at some time a full and meaningful hearing will be available.'
60
Justice Rehnquist found that these justifications-the impracticability
of preseizure hearing and the adequacy of postdeprivation remedy-
applied in this case, involving the "tortious loss of a prisoner's property
as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee."'
' 6 1
First, Justice Rehnquist observed, a predeprivation hearing is obvi-
157. Id at 548 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Id at 549. Justice Powell continued, "That provision was enacted to deter real
abuses by state officials in the exercise of governmental powers. It would make no sense to
open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power,
merely a negligent deed by one who happens to be acting under color of state law." Id
159. 451 U.S. at 537-38 (citing such cases as Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)).
160. 451 U.S. at 540-41 (citation omitted).
161. Id at 541.
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ously impossible, since the state "cannot predict precisely when the loss
will occur."16 Second, citing both Bonner v. Coughlin and Ingraham v.
Wright as precedents,1 63 he held that the existence of Nebraska's tort
claims procedure" supplied the necessary due process. The Court fur-
ther reasoned that the fact that punitive damages and a jury trial are
not available in the state proceeding did not mean there was no due
process.
Although the state remedies may not provide the respondent with
all the relief which may have been available if he could have
proceeded under § 1983, that does not mean that the state reme-
dies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process.
The remedies provided could have fully compensated the respon-
dent for the property loss he suffered.
65
Justice Stewart concluded separately in a short opinion that gener-
ally endorsed the conclusions of the Court.' 66 Justice Blackmun, in a
concurring opinion joined by Justice White, emphasized the narrow-
ness of the holding, stating that it is applicable only to deprivations of
property, not of life or liberty, 167 caused by a negligent, not an inten-
tional, act.168 Futhermore, he emphasized that there was more to the
due process clause than procedural due process. "I continue to believe
that there are certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken
with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves,
antithetical to fundamental notions of due process."'
169
162. Id
163. "We believe that the analysis recited above in Bonner is the proper manner in which
to approach a case such as this. This analysis is also quite consistent with the approach
taken by this Court in Ingraham . Wright,. . . where the Court was confronted with the
claim that corporal punishment in public schools violated due process. Arguably, the facts
presented to the Court in Ingraham were more egregious than those presented here inas-
much as the Court was faced with both an intentional act (as opposed to negligent conduct)
and a deprivation of liberty." Id at 542 (citation omitted).
164. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-8.209 to -8.233 (1976) (allowing claims of prisoners housed
in state penal institutions).
165. 451 U.S. at 544.
166. Id at 544-45 (Stewart, J., concurring).
167. "I do not read the Court's opinion as applicable to a case concerning deprivation of
life or of liberty. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)." 451 U.S. at 545 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
168. "While the 'random and unauthorized' nature of negligent acts by state employees
makes it difficult for the State to 'provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes
place,' it is rare that the same can be said of intentional acts by state employees. When it is
possible for a State to institute procedures to contain and direct the intentional actions of its
officials, it should be required, as a matter of due process, to do so." 451 U.S. at 546 (Black-
mun, J., concurring (citation omitted).
169. Id at 545.
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Justice Marshall agreed with the Court on the negligence point
and also agreed that the Nebraska tort claims procedure could supply
due process.' 70 He parted company, however, with the Court on the
application of the tort claims procedure in this case. He found the fact
that Taylor had not been informed of the availability of the procedure
decisive:
In cases such as this, I believe prison officials have an affirm-
ative obligation to inform a prisoner who claims that he is ag-
grieved by official action about the remedies available under state
law. If they fail to do so, then they should not be permitted to
rely on the existence of such remedies as adequate alternatives to
a § 1983 action for wrongful deprivation of property.'
7 1
IV. Implication of the Decision
In some sense Parratt is a positive decision for civil rights litigants.
First, the issue of negligence, which had so confused the lower courts, is
now settled. State actors cannot win section 1983 cases by convincing a
court that their activity was based on negligence. Further inquiry is
necessary.
Second, the holding on alternative state remedies is quite limited.
The rationale cannot be applied when the deprivation occurs by opera-
tion of state law itself-that is, when state law requires the action that is
attacked as unconstitutional. In its first interpretation of Parratt, the
Supreme Court stated:
In Parratt, the Court emphasized that it was dealing with "a tor-
tious loss of property as a result of a random and unauthorized
act by a state employee. . . ." Here in contrast it is the state
system itself that destroys a complainant's property interest by
operation of law. . . . Parratt was not designed to reach such a
situation.
172
Can Parratt be applied to intentional deprivations of life, liberty, or
property? In light of the votes of the justices, there seems to be little
likelihood of any significant movement in that direction. Two of the
justices who joined the plurality opinion-Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens-are on record as opposing this approach to intentional depriva-
tions of liberty, by their votes in Ingraham.73 Justices Stevens and
Brennan also dissented in Baker v. McCollan, which involved a negli-
170. Id at 554-55 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
171. Id
172. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1426 (1982).
173. 430 U.S. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Justice White's dis-
senting opinion in Ingraham. Id at 683 (White, J., dissenting).
[VoL 9:545
Spring 1982] SECTION 1983: OPENING AND CLOSING THE DOOR 573
gent deprivation of liberty.174 Moreover, Justice Brennan has been one
of the staunchest defenders of the section 1983 action.' 75 Nor can Jus-
tices Blackmun, White, or Marshall be counted on to expand Parratt
into other areas, since Justice Marshall dissented and Justices Black-
mun and White specifically stated in their concurrences in Parratt that
they would not apply its reasoning to intentional takings of property. 1
76
Furthermore, the logic of Parratt is quite limited. The alternate
remedy provided by Nebraska in this case would truly make Taylor
whole. He would have gotten back his loss, $23.50, cent for cent, from
the state of Nebraska. He does not need a personal remedy against the
prison official that would deter future misconduct. Nor does he need
the procedural arsenal of a section 1983 action-punitive damages or a
jury trial-to insure future compliance with prison rules.
If we examine further the rationale of section 1983, individual acts
of misconduct by state actors that violate both constitutional rights and
local tort law should still be cognizable by the civil rights statute. If, for
example, a police officer breaks into a person's home without a war-
rant, he commits both a Fourth Amendment violation and a trespass.
If he uses excessive force on an arrestee, he commits a Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation and a battery. If a prison guard se-
verely beats and injures an inmate for violating prison rules, he com-
mits an Eighth Amendment violation and a battery. Should the
violation be relegated to the state tort remedy in every case? Since the
"liberty" concept in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
F6urth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment interests at issue, an argument
could be made that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, on which section 1983 is based, is satisfied by the existence of
alternative state remedies. It is only when the remedy is not available
in practice that section 1983 comes into play. This argument, as noted
above, has been eagerly embraced by state and local attorneys general
defending section 1983 cases since Parratt was decided.
177
Nevertheless, this argument overlooks the true basis for section
1983 actions: to serve as a watchdog over abuses of power by state and
local officers. The interests protected by the Constitution and by local
tort law are different in kind and degree. Justice Brennan explained in
174. 443 U.S. at 149 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489, 498 (1977).
176. See text accompanying notes 169 & 171 supra. See also Tarkowski v. Hoogasian,
532 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. m. 1982) (Parratt does not apply to intentional taking of property by
state attorney and agents).
177. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
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Bivens that there was a difference between common law trespass (or
assault) by a federal law enforcement officer and a constitutional viola-
tion: "[Plower once granted does not disappear like a magic gift when it
is wrongfully used. An agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the
name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his
own. ' 178 The same would be true of state officers. Any law enforce-
ment officer acting unconstitutionally necessarily possesses greater ca-
pacity for injury to a citizen than does a trespasser (or private
assaulter). The officer is not only physically armed but, more impor-
tantly, he is armed with the full power and authority of the state. Fur-
thermore, the interests protected by the Constitution and state tort law
"may be inconsistent or even hostile."' 17 9 Although a private trespasser
may be resisted by force, no citizen is entitled to resist the execution of
a search warrant or forcibly to resist an officer doing his duty.
Justice Harlan explained this issue in greater detail in his concur-
ring opinion in Monroe v. Pape, the first case discussing the relationship
between section 1983 and common law torts. He examined the issue of
whether or not the Congress that enacted section 1983 "regarded ac-
tions by an official, made possible by his position, as far more serious
than an ordinary state tort, and therefore as a matter of federal con-
cer." 1 0 He concluded it did. "[T]he tone [of the legislative history] is
surely one of overflowing protection of constitutional rights, and there
is not a hint of concern about the administrative burden on the
Supreme Court. . .. ",I" He then noted the difference in damage reme-
dies between a section 1983 action and local tort law.
There will be many cases in which the relief provided by the
state to the victim of a use of state power which the state either
did not or could not constitutionally authorize will be far less
than what Congress may have thought would be fair reimburse-
ment for deprivation of a constitutional right. I will venture only
a few examples. There may be no damage remedy for the loss of
voting rights or for the harm from psychological coercion leading
to a confession. And what is the dollar value of the right to go to
unsegregated schools? Even the remedy for such an unauthor-
ized search and seizure as Monroe was allegedly subjected to
may be only the nominal amount of damages to physical prop-
erty allowable in an action for trespass to land. It would indeed
be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of
178. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
179. Id at 394.
180. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 193 (Harlan, J., concurring).
181. Id at 196.
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common-law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to
redress those injuries which only a state official can cause and
against which the Constitution provides protection.'
8 2
Finally, Justice Harlan argued that section 1985, '83 which unques-
tionably established a federal remedy for conspiracies to deprive a per-
son of equal protection of the laws--certainly not covered by local tort
law-was passed by the same Congress that passed section 1983. Con-
gress must have had a similar purpose in mind for due process viola-
tions covered by section 1983. Justice Harlan explained:
If the same Congress which passed what is now § 1983 also pro-
vided remedies against two or more non-officials who conspire to
prevent an official from granting equal protection of the laws,
then it would seem almost untenable to insist that this Congress
would have hesitated, on the grounds of lack of full state ap-
proval of the officiars act, to provide similar remedies against an
official who, unauthorized, denied that equal protection of the
laws on his own initiative.
184
Behind these arguments of Justices Brennan and Harlan is the
awareness that section 1983 defines the constitutional requirements-it
is a watchdog on abuses of power by state officers. Successful suits
brought under section 1983 teach state officers what the Constitution
demands of them. It would defeat the purpose of the Congress that
passed the law to relegate victims of official abuse to state courts. The
Congress that passed what is now section 1983 demanded a mechanism
by which state officers could be called to account if they violated the
Constitution. They were not satisfied with the vagaries of state tort
law, which protected different interests at times and gave different rem-
edies. Violation of a constitutional right is more serious than violation
of a common law right. An assault or trespass by a police officer who
cannot legally be resisted and who acts with the full power of the state
behind him is different than an assault or trespass by a neighbor. The
common law remedies later available to a victim of a police officer's
assault do not supply due process because they do not protect the same
interests as section 1983 and do not measure the same violations. To
say that the Constitution no longer has a role to play if state officers
beat up a citizen or invade her home is to turn history on its head.
Furthermore, the mechanism by which constitutional rights are
protected in section 1983 cases is different from those involving state
tort actions. Professor Neuborne has argued persuasively that in prac-
182. Id at 196 n.5.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. III 1979).
184. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 199 (citation omitted).
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tice there is no parity between federal forums and state courts protect-
ing constitutional rights.18 5 He notes that federal judges are more
competent technically to determine difficult constitutional issues and
are more attuned to Supreme Court decisions protecting constitutional
rights than are state court judges.'86 Federal judges are also more dis-
tant from the daily application of state criminal law and do not have to
pass on disorderly conduct charges flowing from a political demonstra-
tion.187 Thus, federal judges may view the constitutional issues with
more perspective and concern; federal judges are less subject to imme-
diate political and majoritarian pressures. 188 Moreover, many state
judges are reelected or reappointed from time to time; thus, it may be
difficult for them to find that a police chief or sheriff from the same
jurisdiction engaged in excessive force, false imprisonment, or assault
in a disputed arrest situatibn, especially if the state judge is soon to face
an upcoming election. Federal judges would not face the same prob-
lem in a section 1983 case.
On the other hand, Christina Whitman has argued in her article,
Constitutional Torts,'89 that there is a serious cost in allowing federal
courts in section 1983 actions to be the chief, if not exclusive, guardians
of citizens in their encounters with state officers. She claims that if the
states are no longer viewed as the "primary guardians" of an individ-
ual's person and property, they will lose the capacity or interest to be
so. They will (if they can) avoid deciding issues of individual rights
and defer to the federal courts whenever possible, leading to some kind
of constitutional atrophy in state courts. 190 Furthermore, state courts
should be more involved in setting standards for their own officers,
rather than giving that function to federal judges.' 9' She also claims
that common law tort solutions are "more democratic, more responsive
to the demands of the whole community."' 92 Constitutional adjudica-
tions by federal courts in section 1983 cases are more inflexible and
cannot easily be changed. Finally, state courts have much to contribute
substantively to legal theory by developing new common law torts such
as the right to privacy. 93
185. Neubome, The Myth fPariy, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
186. Id at 1121, 1124.
187. Id at 1125.
188. Id at 1127-28.
189. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. RFv. 5 (1980).
190. Id at 35.
191. Id at 36.
192. Id at 38.
193. Id at 39.
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Professor Whitman's argument fails to take into account the sim-
ple fact that "undemocratic federal judges" distant from the state polit-
ical process are the chief protectors of minority rights against the
majoritarian pressures of the state legal system. It is no accident that
section 1983 suits are often brought by minority group members, dissi-
dents, prisoners, and school children who lack political power to cor-
rect abuses against them by state officials. The majority in the
community often are not sympathetic to assertions of rights by these
groups. To relegate them to common law remedies in the state courts is
to put them at the mercy of the majoritarian pressures that may have
led to their complaints. State judges do heed the majority voice in their
communities, but the Constitution requires protection of those who dis-
please the majority and the state officers who act on the majority's
behalf.
The state attorneys general are attempting to push Parratt to its
furthest extreme in an effort to eliminate section 1983 cases brought in
what they perceive to be unfriendly federal forums. For instance, in a
recent Fifth Circuit case, Duncan v. Poythress,1 94 the state attorney gen-
eral argued that the existence in the state court system of mandamus to
compel the governor to obey the state law precluded a section 1983
action. Apparently, the state thought it irrelevant that the acts of the
governor violated substantive First Amendment rights of various vot-
ers. Even more outrageous is the claim of the Colorado Attorney Gen-
eral, in another case pending in the Supreme Court, O'Dell v.
Esfpinoza,9 5 that allegations of police brutality leading to the death of a
subdued suspect must be handled as a wrongful death action in the
state courts, even though there are damage limitations in such an ac-
tion. This approach is precisely the one condemned by Justice Harlan
in his opinion in Monroe. The interests protected by the wrongful
death statute are completely different from those protected by the due
process clause. If any state officer needs instruction in what the due
process clause demands, it is a police officer alleged to have killed a
suspect lying on the ground. Such an incident cannot be handled in the
same way as an automobile accident involving a private person.
Conclusion
It would be a constitutional scandal of the highest order if the Par-
ratt case were used to turn the clock back, not before 1961 when
194. 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1426 (1982).
195. 633 P.2d 455 (1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 969 (1981).
578 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 9:545
Monroe was decided, but before 1871 when section 1983 was passed.
Even then it was perceived that the Constitution, enforced by federal
courts, must illuminate the dark and dangerous shadows cast when offi-
cial action has injured a citizen's rights. Section 1983 has served an
honored role in our fight for justice for over 100 years, and its contin-
ued force should not be undercut by a strained reading of the Parralt
case.
